

## **The Illusion of International Development: Authoritarian Infrastructuralism and Spin Dictatorship in the Laos-China Railway**

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### **ABSTRACT**

Large-scale market integration and infrastructure development have long been regarded as accelerators of political liberalization in the Global South, according to conventional modernization theory. A significant exception to this assumption, however, is the operationalization of the Laos-China Railway (LCR). This massive undertaking has ironically reinforced the authoritarian tenacity of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) rather than promoting democratic liberalization. This article argues that the LCR serves more as a tool for political survival than as a means of transportation, drawing on Spin Dictatorship theory. The regime uses the project to construct a concept of Performative Modernity—an impressive display of technological prowess designed to project performance credibility while concealing systemic oppression and financial instability. The analysis demonstrates how the LPRP manipulates the narrative of “transforming from land-locked to land-linked” to justify exclusionary development through a qualitative case study employing process tracing. By introducing the concept of Authoritarian Infrastructuralism and challenging the liberal institutionalist perspective, this study shows that infrastructural connectivity can be effectively decoupled from democratic transformation, thereby supporting the consolidation of contemporary autocracy.

**Keywords:** Laos-China Railway; Spin Dictatorship; Authoritarian Infrastructuralism; Performative Modernity; Belt and Road Initiative.

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### **INTRODUCTION**

The Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) represents a significant anomaly in the contemporary political economy of Southeast Asia. As one of the region's smallest and most fiscally constrained economies—with a GDP of approximately US\$15.7 billion and a population of just 7.5 million—Laos has paradoxically pursued one of the most capital-intensive infrastructure strategies in the developing world. This ambition materialized in December 2021 with the completion of the Laos-China Railway (LCR), a US\$5.9 billion high-speed rail project stretching 414 kilometers from Vientiane to the Chinese border at Boten. While the ruling Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) celebrates the initiative as a triumphant manifestation of socialist modernization, the macroeconomic reality presents a profoundly different picture. The World (Angel et al., 2005) classifies Laos as being in “debt distress,” with public and publicly guaranteed debt reaching 108% of GDP in 2023—more than half of which is owed to Chinese creditors. Despite this fiscal crisis and the imminent threat of sovereign default, the regime's commitment to such mega-projects remains unwavering. This stark disjunction between economic fragility and infrastructural grandeur raises a fundamental question that this article addresses: What political logic drives megaproject development in contemporary autocracies, and how does physical infrastructure become instrumentalized for regime survival rather than for economic development?

This phenomenon presents a substantial theoretical issue that challenges the underlying assumptions of traditional modernization theory. Since Seymour Martin Lipset's foundational work, the liberal consensus has argued that economic development, infrastructural

connectedness, and market integration function as antecedents to political democratization (Lipset, 1959; Zhao, 2023). The argument posits that as nations enhance connectivity and expand their middle class, the demand for political accountability eventually rises. However, the trajectory of Laos under the LCR project defies this teleology. Instead of opening up political space, physical integration with the global economy has coincided with the strengthening of single-party dominance. High-speed trains have not ushered in liberal ideals; rather, they have been used to reinforce the legitimacy of an authoritarian government that has remained in power continuously since 1975. This observation aligns with the broader critique of “authoritarian resilience,” which suggests that autocratic regimes are increasingly adept at utilizing the instruments of globalization to secure their survival rather than succumb to its liberalizing pressures (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Nathan, 2003).

To resolve this conundrum, this article contends that the Laos–China Railway constitutes a deliberate policy of detaching prosperity from democracy. Drawing on Guriev and Treisman’s (2022) paradigm of Spin Dictatorship, this paper suggests that the LPRP has transitioned from relying exclusively on fear and repression to mastering the art of information manipulation and image cultivation. In this framework, the LCR is not merely a transport utility but a platform for Performative Modernity—a spectacular demonstration of technological prowess designed to generate performance legitimacy. By delivering tangible, high-visibility infrastructure, the regime cultivates an image of effectiveness and progress, thereby neutralizing public dissent regarding corruption and the lack of political freedom. This infrastructure statecraft enables the elite to project a narrative of national regeneration while concealing the structural violence of displacement and the unsustainability of debt-driven growth (Kuik & Rosli, 2023; Schindler et al., 2023).

Furthermore, the initiative serves a dual role in elite consolidation. Beyond the public spectacle, the political economy of the LCR operates through mechanisms of Authoritarian Infrastructuralism, wherein large-scale construction projects generate rent-seeking opportunities that bind the ruling coalition together. Consistent with the logic of Selectorate Theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003), the allocation of contracts, land concessions, and associated development rights secures the loyalty of key political and military leaders. Thus, the railway functions as a spatial fix (Harvey, 2005) that temporarily resolves the regime’s accumulation dilemma while entrenching its political control. The initiative underscores how external patronage—particularly the “no-strings-attached” financing model of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—enables local autocrats to circumvent the governance conditionalities typically enforced by Western donors (Wijaya & Camba, 2025).

The urgency of this research is both multidimensional and compelling. First, from a scholarly perspective, the failure to theorize Authoritarian Infrastructuralism represents a significant lacuna in the literatures of International Political Economy and Comparative Politics. As Chinese overseas infrastructure financing continues to expand, and as other illiberal powers (Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia) increasingly adopt similar infrastructure diplomacy strategies, the absence of adequate conceptual tools to analyze the political effects of these investments constitutes a serious theoretical deficit. Second, from a policy perspective, Western development agencies and multilateral financial institutions continue to operate under the outdated assumptions of modernization theory, structuring their aid conditionalities around “good governance” reforms that are increasingly circumvented by recipient autocracies

through strategic engagement with non-Western creditors. The World Bank's (2024) Lao PDR Economic Monitor candidly acknowledges that "traditional policy dialogue has had limited traction in influencing fiscal discipline"—a diplomatic formulation that obscures a more fundamental crisis of relevance. Third, and most urgently, the human consequences of Authoritarian Infrastructuralism demand scholarly attention. The displacement of 371 uncompensated households along the LCR corridor, the ecological degradation of water sources from construction waste, and the systematic silencing of dissent through what this article terms "censorship by noise" are not incidental externalities but constitutive features of a development model that prioritizes regime survival over human welfare.

Building upon these research gaps and theoretical developments, this study pursues three interconnected objectives. First, it seeks to deconstruct the narrative-engineering strategies through which the LPRP has transformed the LCR from transportation infrastructure into a master signifier of national salvation, analyzing how the "land-locked to land-linked" discourse operates to delegitimize dissent and manufacture consensus. Second, it exposes the political-economy mechanisms through which the railway's opaque financial structure and joint-venture arrangements facilitate elite consolidation, demonstrating how construction rents, land concessions, and speculative accumulation function as technologies of authoritarian patronage. Third, it illuminates the politics of silence that systematically obscures the human and ecological costs of megaproject development, revealing how the spectacle of high-speed modernity is weaponized to render displacement and environmental degradation politically invisible. Through these analytical moves, the article demonstrates that the LCR is not merely a transport corridor connecting Laos to China but a technology of power that links the LPRP's present to its future—a mechanism for inoculating the one-party state against the destabilizing forces of the twenty-first century.

The theoretical foundations of Spin Dictatorship and their relevance to infrastructure development in the Global South are first established in this essay. It then traces the historical trajectory of the LPRP's development plan, contrasting the rhetoric of connectivity with the reality of budgetary dependency. The subsequent analysis dissects the LCR case study, investigating how the narrative of "transforming the nation" is deployed to silence critical discussions of debt and displacement. Finally, the discussion broadens to address the implications of Authoritarian Infrastructuralism for international development policy, concluding that without adequate checks and balances, infrastructure aid risks becoming a subsidy for the maintenance of autocracy. By evaluating the LCR through this perspective, this work contributes to a more nuanced understanding of how material progress may be employed to prevent political transformation in the twenty-first century.

## METHOD

To analyze the decoupling of development from democracy in the Lao PDR, this study adopts a qualitative, single-case study design focusing on the Laos–China Railway (LCR). This analytical decision rests on the status of Laos as a "crucial case" for understanding the phenomenon of Authoritarian Infrastructuralism. While quantitative studies can capture macroeconomic correlations between Chinese investment and authoritarian stability, they often fail to reveal the granular causal mechanisms—specifically, the discursive strategies and internal elite negotiations—that enable a regime to convert physical infrastructure into political

legitimacy. Following the logic of George and Bennett (2005), a single-case study permits “process tracing,” allowing this research to chart the sequential trajectory of the LCR from its inception as a geopolitical vision to its operationalization as a tool of regime survival. This method is particularly valuable for contrasting the “backstage” material reality (the debt) with the “frontstage” performance of the regime (the spin)—a contrast central to this article’s theoretical framework.

The data collection technique relies on triangulating three key categories of documented evidence to ensure robust verification of the “spin” versus the “reality.” First, to investigate the regime’s strategic intent, the study examines official policy documents, notably the National Socio-Economic Development Plans (NSEDP) and Vision 2030 publications. These texts are regarded as “hegemonic scripts” that encode the LPRP’s survival logic rather than serve merely as administrative roadmaps. Analysis of these documents traces the emergence of the “land-locked to land-linked” narrative, illustrating how the regime linguistically reframed a logistical disadvantage into a nationalist rallying cry to justify the railway’s exorbitant costs.

Second, to reconstruct the material reality often obscured by state propaganda, this paper draws on technical reports and fiscal data from international financial organizations and independent research agencies. Primary reliance is placed on recent Lao PDR Economic Monitors issued by the World Bank (2023; 2024) and debt sustainability analyses by AidData. These sources provide essential “hard data” on the hidden terms of joint ventures, debt-to-GDP ratios, and sovereign guarantees. By comparing the World Bank’s assessments of “fiscal fragility” and “solvency risks” with the regime’s optimistic growth projections, the analysis reveals the depth of information distortion characteristic of a spin dictatorship. This stage is vital to demonstrating the “performative” nature of the projected modernity—it quantifies the gap between the image of prosperity and the reality of precarity (Adriansyah & Wu, 2020).

Third, to operationalize the concept of Performative Modernity, the study undertakes a discourse analysis of state-controlled media, particularly the Vientiane Times and the Lao News Agency (KPL). As the English-language mouthpiece of the government intended for foreign audiences, the Vientiane Times functions as a key channel for the LPRP’s external image-making. The analysis examines the corpus of publications produced during the project’s inception (2016) and its initial operational phase (2023–2024). Recurring linguistic patterns and visual motifs such as “modernization,” “connectivity,” “friendship,” and “party leadership” are identified during the coding process to demonstrate how the railway is systematically anthropomorphized as the nation’s savior. This discourse analysis underscores how the state monopolizes the media landscape, saturating it with imagery of technological triumph to suppress critical narratives concerning displacement and environmental degradation.

By integrating these three data streams—the aspirational (policy), the material (economic statistics), and the performative (media)—this methodology reconstructs the architecture of the LPRP’s survival strategy. It extends beyond a descriptive account of the railway to illuminate the political utility of infrastructure, establishing a replicable framework for examining other BRI mega-projects within authoritarian regimes.

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

### **Analysis: The Laos-China Railway as Political Theater**

To analyze the Laos–China Railway (LCR) solely through the prism of logistical efficiency or macroeconomic return is to misunderstand its essential utility to the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP). Beyond its function as a transport corridor, the LCR operates as a prototypical “technology of power,” a tangible embodiment of the regime’s strategy to navigate the precarious shift from ideological legitimacy to performance-based survival. Under a spin dictatorship, the railway serves as a vast political stage upon which modernization rituals are performed to generate public acquiescence in the absence of democratic mandates. By anchoring the nation’s destiny to this megaproject, the LPRP effectively insulates itself from criticism, presenting the survival of the Party as synonymous with the connectivity of the nation.

This research deconstructs this phenomenon by moving beyond the binary framing of “debt traps” versus “development opportunities” to examine how infrastructure is instrumentalized for authoritarian endurance. Three interconnected processes underpin this political theater. First, to divert attention from structural poverty, the analysis explores the project’s narrative engineering—particularly how the regime has rhetorically transformed the nation’s geographic vulnerability into a teleological promise of “land-linked” prosperity (Section 4.1). Second, it interrogates the political economy of entrenchment, demonstrating how the project’s opaque financial structure and joint-venture arrangements facilitate elite consolidation through the distribution of rents and land concessions, in line with the logic of Selectorate Theory (Section 4.2). Finally, it exposes the politics of silence by revealing how the railway’s spectacular visibility is weaponized to obscure the displacement of local populations and the repression of dissent, thereby maintaining the illusion of seamless modernization (Section 4.3). Through these analytical lenses, the LCR emerges not merely as a conduit linking Laos to China but as a mechanism reinforcing the one-party state.

### **The Narrative Shift: Engineering Hope**

The political efficacy of the Laos–China Railway (LCR) hinges significantly on a discursive makeover that reframes the nation’s geographical reality. For the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP), the “engineering of hope” surrounding the railway—rather than its steel and concrete—is the most potent mechanism of legitimacy. This narrative strategy begins by pathologizing the country’s landscape. For many years, the government has aggressively cultivated a sense of “geographical trauma,” depicting Laos’s landlocked condition as a historical ailment responsible for the nation’s persistent underdevelopment rather than merely a topographical fact. The absence of a seacoast has been portrayed in official propaganda as a structural defect that has confined the Lao people within the boundaries of poverty—an imprisonment of geography. By labeling the country as suffering from this “geographical disease,” the government constructs a rationale for pursuing an extreme and costly remedy. As Guriev and Treisman (2022) observe, this aligns with the operational logic of a spin dictatorship, in which leaders fabricate or exaggerate existential crises to justify dramatic policy measures that might otherwise invite criticism for their fiscal irrationality.

Within this framework, the LCR is framed not as a discretionary policy choice but as a form of “strong medicine”—the only cure capable of breaking the chains of isolation.

This discursive construction functions to obscure the role of institutional inefficiencies in perpetuating poverty. As (Molasy, 2025) argues in the context of international development instruments in Thailand, legal and structural frameworks are often decisive in addressing transnational problems such as human trafficking. Similarly, in Laos, the primary causes of economic stagnation lie in governance weaknesses, corruption, and insufficient investment in human capital rather than geography alone. By directing public attention toward the physical terrain, however, the LPRP effectively absolves itself of responsibility for these internal governance failures. The narrative relocates blame from Party mismanagement to the mountains themselves. Consequently, the proposed solution takes the form of grand physical engineering rather than structural institutional reform—reforms that might threaten the Party’s monopoly on power. The “land-locked” designation thus becomes a political strategy that makes the public more accepting of the railway’s immense cost, as the alternative is portrayed as a permanent sentence to backwardness.

Against this backdrop of manufactured vulnerability, the regime deploys the “land-linked” slogan as a teleological remedy. The transition from “land-locked” to “land-linked” is presented as the nation’s destiny—a journey from darkness into light under the Party’s visionary leadership. During the project’s groundbreaking and subsequent inauguration, state media outlets and Party officials adopted almost messianic rhetoric, portraying the railway as the “savior” of the national economy. This branding campaign represents an act of Performative Modernity, designed to convey that the LPRP possesses an exclusive capacity to lead the nation into the twenty-first century, transcending mere transportation economics. The high-speed train, with its sleek design and advanced Chinese technology, becomes a powerful visual symbol of this promise. It produces a symbolic rupture with the past, evoking the image of a “great leap” that bypasses the incremental path of progress typically required of agrarian societies.

The political advantage of this concentrated optimism becomes clearer when contrasted with alternative approaches to conflict resolution and development in the region. For instance, (Molasy & Elfadani, 2025; Morgenbesser, 2020) show how Southern Thailand’s special autonomy arrangements employ decentralization and local identity accommodation to promote peace and development. In stark contrast, the LCR exemplifies a model of hyper-centralization. The railway physically and politically binds the periphery to the center (Vientiane) and, by extension, to Beijing, rather than fostering local autonomy or devolving authority to spur regional growth. The “land-linked” narrative undermines dissent by establishing a unifying national mission—criticizing the railway becomes tantamount to opposing the country’s lifeline and future. Thus, the infrastructure narrative in Laos manufactures political stability through coerced consensus on modernization. It suppresses alternative visions of development that might prioritize social welfare or agricultural sustainability over megaprojects, while in other contexts, autonomy nurtures peace through inclusion.

However, this spectacular narrative functions primarily as a distraction from the persistence of deep structural poverty. The “engineering of hope” depends on the physical presence of the infrastructure to overshadow the invisibility of socioeconomic deprivation. While the LCR allows passengers to travel at 160 kilometers per hour, the living standards of

those residing along the tracks remain unchanged. The story of speed conceals the realities of an underfunded education system and a deteriorating public health sector (Scott, 1998). The state invests in the hardware of modernity while neglecting the software of human capital, thereby producing a “modernity gap.” This dynamic echoes (Molasy, 2024) discussion of the “digital frontier,” where rapid technological adoption in governance must be matched by sustained efforts to address the underlying causes of exploitation, such as human trafficking. Similarly, the “infrastructure frontier” in Laos is advancing at great speed, yet governance mechanisms to protect vulnerable populations from the negative repercussions—environmental degradation, labor exploitation, and displacement—lag far behind.

The obsession with achieving “land-linked” status acts as a dazzling light that blinds the public to deeper structural realities. When people are captivated by the technological spectacle of the train, critical questions about opportunity costs remain unasked. The billions of dollars consumed in railway debt servicing represent resources diverted from social investments that could effectively mitigate the very poverty the railway is purported to alleviate. Consequently, the LCR establishes a Performative Modernity—a visually impressive but substantively hollow modernity for the rural majority. The LPRP has succeeded in manufacturing hope, yet in doing so, it has detached the appearance of development from the essence of human well-being, leaving the Lao people with a world-class railway but third-world living conditions. In this sense, the “land-linked” narrative serves less as a cure for economic malaise than as a sedative, soothing the pains of authoritarian existence while leaving its causes untouched.

### **The Economics of Entrenchment**

The Laos–China Railway (LCR) project’s financial architecture reveals a starkly different reality—one defined by the “economics of entrenchment,” despite the official narrative of national renewal. To understand the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party’s (LPRP) continued resilience amid a deepening financial crisis, it is necessary to revisit the fundamental political economy question of *cui bono*—who benefits? A forensic review of the project’s financing and revenue distribution mechanisms shows that the LCR functions as an apparatus for elite wealth accumulation while socializing its risks across the broader public. This dynamic exemplifies the core logic of Authoritarian Infrastructuralism, in which infrastructure investments are designed primarily to generate short-term political rents that sustain the ruling coalition rather than to ensure long-term commercial viability.

The disparity between state burden and elite gain is most evident in the joint-venture structure used to finance the US\$5.9 billion project. Under the concession agreement, the railway is operated by the Laos–China Railway Company Limited, a joint venture in which Chinese state-owned enterprises hold a 70% majority stake, leaving the Lao government with a 30% minority share. Although publicly portrayed as a partnership of equals, the underlying financial arrangement places a severe burden on the Lao treasury. According to the project’s financial profile, the Lao government’s equity contribution—amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars—was not drawn from fiscal surpluses but primarily financed through loans from the Export–Import Bank of China. Consequently, the state has incurred massive sovereign debt to acquire a minority stake in a foreign-controlled asset. From a macroeconomic standpoint, this represents a form of “fiscal suicide”; the World Bank (2024) classifies Laos as

being in “debt distress,” with public and publicly guaranteed debt exceeding 100% of GDP—a precarious position directly exacerbated by the railway’s obligations.

Yet what appears irrational in macroeconomic terms is entirely rational through the lens of authoritarian survival. *Selectorate Theory* posits that autocratic stability depends on the distribution of private goods to a small “winning coalition” of elites—typically senior military officers, party cadres, and politically connected business families (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). In this context, the profitability of the LCR is not determined by ticket sales or freight revenues, which may take decades to recover costs, but by the immediate financial flows generated during its construction and development phases. The project’s US\$5.9 billion price tag created a rent-seeking bonanza for the connected elite, serving as a massive liquidity injection into a small economy. Although major contracts were awarded to Chinese state-owned enterprises, a vast network of subcontracts for land clearance, material supply (sand, gravel, cement), and logistics was funneled through local intermediaries linked to the LPRP patronage network. As a result, the project operates as a conduit for converting public liabilities (future debt repayments) into private assets (construction earnings) for the regime’s inner circle.

This extraction mechanism is reinforced by what David Harvey describes as a spatial fix, adapted here to the context of internal colonization. The monetization of land along the railway corridor has become a key vehicle for elite enrichment. The concession agreement grants the joint venture not only the right of way for railway operations but also extensive rights to develop surrounding land for commercial and industrial purposes. This framework has triggered a wave of speculative accumulation. Exploiting informational asymmetries, political elites with prior knowledge of planned development zones and station sites have been able to acquire strategic parcels of land before public disclosure, reaping the windfall profits from rising property values induced by the project. This process resembles a form of enclosure, in which the joint venture and its domestic partners convert communal assets—primarily agricultural land traditionally belonging to local communities—into exclusive private property.

The experience of the 371 households that faced delayed compensation, as reported in prior field studies, illustrates the exclusionary logic of this development model. While the state machinery is efficient in clearing land to meet construction deadlines, it is deliberately sluggish in processing compensation for displaced residents. The bureaucratic dualism of Authoritarian Infrastructuralism is a systemic strength rather than a flaw: it ensures that the costs of development are borne by those with the least political power—the rural poor—while the benefits accrue to those with the most. By controlling lucrative land concessions and development rights, the LPRP leadership effectively constructs a new economic foundation insulated from taxation. This financial autonomy reduces the regime’s accountability to citizens; as long as the Party can sustain its patronage network through infrastructure rents and external borrowing, it can afford to disregard public discontent over the national debt crisis.

Moreover, the LCR consolidates the mutually reinforcing relationship between Chinese state capital and the Lao political elite. As (Wijaya & Camba, 2025) observes in her study of state-capital dynamics in Southeast Asia, risks in such projects are often “contested and compromised” rather than genuinely mitigated. In the Lao context, this “compromise” entails the surrender of economic sovereignty in exchange for regime security. By integrating the Lao economy more deeply into China’s supply chain through the railway, the LPRP has secured a

powerful external patron. Although Western analysts interpret the debt to China as a "trap," the Lao government views it as a lifeline that guarantees Beijing's continued support. China, for its part, cannot afford the political failure of the LCR, a flagship project of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Consequently, the debt interdependence between Vientiane and Beijing produces a reciprocal guarantee of stability.

In conclusion, the economics of the Laos-China Railway reflect a deliberate decoupling of national welfare from elite interests (Chanthavong, 2024; Denata, 2024). The initiative generates a bifurcated reality: a state burdened by unsustainable debt and an elite enriched through construction rents and land speculation. By translating the abstract ideal of "connectivity" into direct material rewards for the ruling alliance, the LPRP has leveraged the railway to entrench its authority. The LCR, therefore, is not a public good in the classical sense, but a mechanism of wealth concentration that disguises the transfer of resources from the public purse to private hands under the banner of national progress.

### **Silencing the Critics: The Dark Side of Modernity**

The building of the Laos-China Railway (LCR) is a prime example of the "spin dictatorship's" defining paradox: the cohabitation of systemic invisibility in the area of human rights and hyper-visibility in the area of infrastructure. While the previous sections demonstrated how the railway works as a mechanism for story fabrication and elite wealth accumulation, this final analytical piece interrogates the coercive underbelly of "performative modernity." In the LPRP's political theater, the glistening stations and high-speed locomotives serve not only as symbols of development but also as means of misdirection. They function to divert the public focus from the "dark side of modernity," notably the displacement of local inhabitants and the damage of the environment. This phenomena might be understood as "spectacular violence"—a sort of injury that is rendered invisible precisely because it is buried beneath the blinding spectacle of development.

The human cost of this modernization plan is quantified yet systematically concealed from the official narrative. Empirical data demonstrates a striking disparity between the regime's promises of "people-centered development" and the reality of dispossession on the ground. According to internal records and grievance statistics mentioned in recent studies, as of late 2024, roughly 371 families affected by the railway construction have yet to receive their promised compensation, despite the project being fully operational. This statistic symbolizes the tip of a much broader iceberg of displacement, as thousands of villages have been evicted from their ancestral lands to make way for the rails and the associated economic zones. The contrast is striking: the displaced populations are frequently forced into makeshift barracks or resettlement sites devoid of basic utilities, while the Vientiane station boasts cathedral-like architecture and cutting-edge amenities intended to impress international visitors. The advantages of connectivity are concentrated in the hands of the urban elite and foreign investors, while the costs are externalized to the rural periphery; this spatial segregation reflects the political exclusion inherent in the regime. In the logic of authoritarian infrastructuralism, these citizens are not beneficiaries of development but "obstacles" to be removed, their livelihoods sacrificed at the altar of the "land-linked" goal.

However, the LPRP regime's continued existence depends more on a clever tactic known as "censorship by noise" than it does on the brutal punishment of their victims. Guriev and

Treisman (2022) argue that current "spin dictators" distinguish themselves from classic despots by avoiding widespread violence that may provoke international sanctions. Instead of murdering protesters—a action that would destroy the appearance of a beneficent, progressive state—the Lao regime suppresses dissent by saturating the media environment with "positive noise." The state-controlled media machinery, lead by outlets such as the Vientiane Times, engages in a continuous campaign of "good news." For every single murmur of concern regarding unpaid compensation or land grabs, the government issues a barrage of reports hailing the "eternal friendship" between Laos and China, the spike in tourist arrivals, or the logistical efficiency of cross-border trade.

The victims' voices are successfully muffled by this informative tactic. The misery of the 371 underpaid families is not required hidden through a total media blackout, which might arouse suspicion, but is instead rendered inconsequential by the enormous volume of triumphalist propaganda. The story of the LCR as a national savior is so pervasive that individual grievances are presented as insignificant or treasonous. By monopolizing the "attention economy" of the nation, the LPRP ensures that the public remains transfixed on the spectacle of the train rather than the misfortune of the passenger. The locomotive's roar, which is loud enough to drown out the whispers of the oppressed without a single gunshot, acts as a sound metaphor for the regime's authority. This "censorship by noise" helps the dictatorship to preserve its image as a competent, technocratic administrator while structurally disregarding its commitments to the most vulnerable.

Furthermore, the "dark side" of this modernism extends to the ecological devastation sanctioned under the pretense of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The haste to build the railway by the 2021 deadline—timed to coincide with the LPRP's National Congress and the centenary of the Chinese Communist Party—necessitated a disregard for environmental regulations. Field observations suggest substantial deforestation along the rail track and the inappropriate dumping of construction trash, which has contaminated local water sources (Daud & Yuniasih, 2021). In a liberal democracy, such environmental carelessness would normally spark mobilization by civil society organizations, independent environmental NGOs, or a free press. But in the context of "authoritarian regionalism," these safeguards are conspicuously lacking. The relationship between the LPRP and Beijing runs on a premise of non-interference that extends to environmental norms. The project's Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) lacked the rigor and transparency necessary to hold the joint venture responsible, and they were primarily procedural formalities.

This absence of accountability is inherently built in the "Beijing Consensus" model of development, which stresses speed and scale over environmental and social safeguards (Schindler & DiCarlo, 2022). There is no way to voice environmental complaints in Laos due to the absence of an autonomous civil society. As a result, the LCR's ecological obligation is postponed, just like its financial liability. The dictatorship trades long-term environmental viability for short-term political legitimacy, calculating that the visual impact of the railway will secure its power now, regardless of the ecological costs tomorrow.

In conclusion, the Laos-China Railway serves as a perfect microcosm of the LPRP government itself: big and imposing on the exterior, yet brittle and authoritarian at its core. The investigation of the narrative alterations, the economic entrenchment, and the silencing of critics demonstrates that the LCR is considerably more than a transport infrastructure; it is a

"technology of power" designed to inoculate the one-party state against the forces of the twenty-first century. By successfully decoupling development from democracy, the LPRP has proved that it is possible to upgrade the hardware of the nation while keeping its political software firmly planted in authoritarian authority. The railway, therefore, stands not as a monument to the people's prosperity, but as a witness to the regime's survival—a survival paid with borrowed money, contested territory, and the suppressed cries of those left behind on the platform.

### **Discussion: Decoupling Development from Democracy**

The operationalization of the Laos–China Railway (LCR) lends empirical weight to a growing theoretical consensus: the trajectory of modernization in the Global South is no longer inseparably tied to the liberal-democratic paradigm. The case of the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPRP) demonstrates that economic connectivity and infrastructure development can be successfully "decoupled" from political reform. Rather than serving as a conduit for democratic values, the LCR has functioned as a tool of authoritarian consolidation, allowing the regime to perform a "performative modernity" that satisfies the public's desire for progress while preserving the single-party state's monopoly on power. This phenomenon is not unique to Laos; rather, it reflects a broader regional trend in which infrastructure is increasingly deployed as an instrument of political legitimization.

To contextualize the Lao experience, it is instructive to compare it with the Jakarta–Bandung High-Speed Railway (Whoosh) in Indonesia. According to (Wijaya, 2025), the Indonesian project was also characterized by a logic in which "risk is not measured, but contested and compromised." In both Vientiane and Jakarta, the decision to pursue high-speed rail was motivated less by commercial feasibility than by the desire for a "spatial fix" symbolizing the government's capacity to deliver modernity. However, the political consequences of these projects diverged sharply due to differing regime types. In democratic Indonesia, the Whoosh project was subjected to intense public scrutiny, parliamentary debate, and electoral contestation, compelling the Jokowi administration to navigate complex coalition politics to justify cost overruns. In contrast, no comparable accountability mechanisms existed in authoritarian Laos. The LPRP absorbed the project's risks into the sovereign debt structure without the need to "contest" them publicly, owing to the absence of a free press or opposition parties. This contrast underscores a critical distinction: authoritarian leaders use infrastructure to make voting unnecessary, whereas democratic leaders use it to win votes. By delivering the "goods" of modernity without the "noise" of democracy, the LPRP positions its model as a more decisive and efficient path to development than the deliberative processes of its democratic neighbors.

This narrative of efficiency deals a serious blow to the credibility of traditional Western development assistance. For decades, Western aid to Laos and the broader Mekong region has operated under a "good governance" model, making financial support conditional upon improvements in human rights, transparency, and the rule of law. While normatively appealing, this approach has often resulted in "abstract" aid—capacity-building workshops, gender equality programs, and legal reforms—that yield slow and largely intangible results. In contrast, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which operationalizes the "Beijing Consensus," offers "concrete" assistance. The LCR stands as a tangible, visible symbol of progress achieved

in less than a decade. The immediate visual impact of a high-speed train is far more compelling to a population fatigued by poverty than the abstract promise of civil liberties. As (Loke & Guo, 2025) argue, China's strategy of "association without assimilation" enables partner governments to enjoy the benefits of connectivity without feeling that their political systems are being encroached upon. Accordingly, the LPRP's embrace of the LCR constitutes a rational rejection of Western conditionalities. Why accept aid that threatens regime survival through democratization when one can accept aid that strengthens it through infrastructure? The West's failure to present a viable alternative to "infrastructure statecraft" has effectively ceded the intellectual and policy ground to an illiberal paradigm of development.

Furthermore, the LCR stands as a testament to the enduring concept of "authoritarian resilience." Contrary to modernization theory's prediction that autocracies are brittle and destined to collapse under economic complexity, the LPRP has demonstrated remarkable adaptability. The regime has abandoned the aesthetics of the Cold War—drab uniforms and Marxist slogans—in favor of the aesthetics of global capitalism: high-speed trains, Special Economic Zones, and digital connectivity. As (Guriev & Treisman, 2022) note, contemporary "spin dictators" thrive not by instilling fear but by projecting competence. The LPRP realizes this image on a grand scale through the LCR, signaling to the emerging middle class that the Party is not an obstacle to the future but its architect. By appropriating the symbols of modernity, the regime neutralizes the revolutionary potential of the youth. The train proclaims, "You do not need a revolution to be modern; you only need the Party."

Yet this resilience comes at a profound cost, revealing a brittleness disguised by concrete. The "decoupling" of development from democracy has produced a state rich in infrastructure but deficient in institutions. The absence of independent oversight blinded policymakers to the approaching debt crisis and allowed the project to proceed unchecked. Thus, the LCR paradoxically represents both the regime's crowning achievement and its deepest vulnerability. It has secured elite dominance in the short term through performative legitimacy and rent distribution, but at the price of mortgaging the nation's sovereign future to foreign creditors. The Lao case therefore serves as a cautionary tale for the Global South: when development is separated from democracy, infrastructure becomes a tool of control rather than a public good—leaving the country "land-linked" to the world, yet politically bound within an authoritarian embrace.

## **CONCLUSION**

The case of the Laos–China Railway (LCR) presents a compelling empirical challenge to the enduring optimism of modernization theory. For decades, the international development community has operated under the assumption that the "software" of liberal democracy would inevitably emerge from the "hardware" of connectivity. The expectation was that as governments such as the Lao PDR integrated into global markets, the imperatives of openness, accountability, and the rule of law would gradually erode the foundations of authoritarian rule. This essay has argued that such teleology is not only flawed but increasingly obsolete in the era of spin dictatorship. By tracing the political life cycle of the LCR, this study reveals how the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) has effectively decoupled economic development from political liberalization, using the railway to construct a new architecture of Authoritarian Infrastructuralism.

The findings of this study demonstrate that the LCR functions as a multifaceted technology of power. First, through narrative engineering, the regime has transformed the geographical disadvantage of being “land-locked” into a nationalist mandate for relentless modernization—silencing dissent by framing the railway as the nation’s sole path to survival. Second, by channeling land concessions and construction profits to appease the regime’s “winning coalition” while externalizing the debilitating debt to the public, the project has created a mechanism of elite cohesion through a political economy of entrenchment. Third, through the politics of silence, the spectacle of high-speed modernity has been weaponized to obscure the structural violence of displacement and environmental degradation. In sum, the railway has fortified the one-party state against democratic norms rather than opening the nation to them.

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