

## **European Union Priority Agenda Post-Covid 19 Pandemics in Security and Defense Sectors**

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### **ABSTRACT**

*This research examines the European Union's (EU) post-Covid-19 priority agenda in the defense and security sector, emphasizing its urgency in addressing new threats and protecting citizens. The study identifies five key agendas: enhancing military capacity, bolstering the European defense industry, fostering cooperation among member states, strengthening partnerships with other countries, and improving cybersecurity. These priorities aim to reinforce the EU's defense and security capabilities in a rapidly changing global landscape. Using the Constructivism paradigm by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, this qualitative study highlights how security is shaped by complex social processes influenced by European identity, norms, and historical interactions. The theory posits that European identity, forged through shared history and political engagement, is central to shaping the EU's security policies. Initial findings reveal that the EU's defense and security agenda not only addresses external threats but also seeks to consolidate a unified European identity in security matters. The research underscores the strategic importance of adapting defense measures post-pandemic to enhance resilience, cohesion, and collective security within the EU. By focusing on these priorities, the EU aims to navigate emerging challenges while reinforcing its identity and solidarity among member states.*

**Keywords:** *European Union, defense and security agenda, Constructivism, European Security Theory, post-Covid-19.*

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### **INTRODUCTION**

Coronavirus disease (Covid-19) is a plague disease infection caused by the SARS-Cov-2 virus. This case was first identified by the Wuhan City Health Commission, China on December 31, 2019. Lack of readiness and preventive action from other countries made the spread of this virus spread massively from Asia to Europe. The Covid-19 pandemic has a very significant impact against countries around the world, not even EU member states escape from this pandemic. Spreading the Covid-19 pandemic in European Union member states was first suspected of the consequence activity tourists entering EU countries that carry the virus without detected because the new covid-19 shows symptom after 5-6 days infected. Traveling tourists from Asian countries do journey through transportation air then transmit this virus to another passenger later deployment continues through local transmission. Spread through local transmission is another way of spreading becoming more massive in the member countries of the European Union, the influencing factors among them are facility general, place gathering public activities, meetings until lack of tracking facility society that has infected before showing symptoms. Individuals who have been infected or not showing symptoms getting infected with Covid-19 are difficult to recognize because at first it wasn't their regulation special to "housing" the whole community with various activities outside the house. This is exacerbating the situation and spread of covid-19 to be difficult for identified in the European Union Region.

The main problem must be faced by the government, namely public health officers, Limited medical and inadequate health facilities for accommodating the condition of the infected community simultaneously. Another problem is economic society, as one action preventive measures that can be taken is do closing border, limit interaction public like forbidden get together, do isolation, quarantine as well as recommend public For Work from house. This preventive movement then impacts economic society and state opinion because income from the tourism, hotel and business sector scale small, unemployment experience enhancement as well as economy experience significant contraction, Greece and Spain are the two European Union member countries that are experiencing a decline in their economy. The European Union member countries also experienced diverse experiences in dealing with this Covid-19 pandemic. Spain and Italy experienced enough crisis bad at first the emergence of covid-19 in their country, meanwhile Germany and Denmark were able guard level more spread of covid-19 low. Level case low spread because response fast Germany and Denmark in providing tool protector (PPE), add capacity place sleep in the hospital as well as attention more to health officer. Vaccination also holds role important in pressing number spread of covid-19, EU countries are facing challenge for speed up production vaccine, do distribution vaccine to the member states of the European Union. Adaptability, State resilience as well collaboration among EU countries to be key important to handle deployment Covid-19 cases that occurred in the European Union Region.

After the Covid-19 pandemic ended There is fundamental problem besides health and the economy faced by European Union countries, namely in the sector security and defence. Before covid-19 was sticking out on the surface, one problem security and defense faced by the European Union is terrorism and regional conflicts, but threats in a new form could happen in the future. Over the last seven decades, the European Union has played a major role for stability on the European continent, by projecting social, economic, cultural and defense interests and values. Europe and contribute to peace and security around the world. With 27 Member States and 450 million citizens, the European Union remains the largest single country in the world. Since the outbreak of war in Europe, with Russian aggression to Ukraine which according to the European Union is unjustified and unreasonable, added major geopolitical changes that challenge the EU's ability to remain to defend its interests. The European Union rate itself lives in an era of strategic competition and complex security threats. Increased military aggression causing severe and massive humanitarian suffering, the power of defense systems and weapons, vaccines, data, and technology standards are all considered political instruments competition nowadays. Access to the high seas, outer space and the digital realm is increasingly being contested (EEAS, 2023). The European Union is committed to defend Europe as a security, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence within the scope internationally. recognized borders must be fully respected. Support Ukraine face aggression by Russia and show determination like never before to restore peace in Europe.

Environmentally moderate security conflict requires the European Union to make leaps and increase capacity and will to strengthen resilience and solidarity between fellow members. Solidarity between Member States must give birth to a level of presence, effectiveness, and visibility in the European Union region and even on the world stage. The European Union must act as a strong and coherent political actor who upholds tall values and principles based on democracy, so take more lots, not quite enough answers for security of Europe and its citizens

as well as support peace and security internationally (EEAS, 2023). In the end, based on the situation the writer believes that examining priority agendas sector EU security and defense becomes very crucial and interesting to discuss. In the next section writers try pouring actual data for more continuing to discuss the priority agenda.

Strengthening defense and security in protecting the country as well as citizens of new threats like covid-19 become important and urgent matters for the European Union to do. Considering and experience how covid-19 gave a significant crisis so important for the European Union to set priority agenda within the sector defense and security as step mitigate and address threats new form in the future come. As for this writing will focuses on the five priority agendas of the European Union including; a) increase capacity military, b) reinforcement industry European defense, including investing in technology research and development defense, c) improvement cooperation between European Union countries, d) increase cooperation with partner countries like NATO and partners international, e) as well enhancement security cyber, digital transformation, investing in technology up-to-date and constructive mechanism mutual virtual response coordinate. This research is trying to answer the question why it is important for the European Union to establish steps sector adjustments defense security as a priority agenda post pandemic Covid-19 and what program it covers. What are the five priority agendas?

## **METHOD**

This study explains the priority agenda of the European Union after the covid-19 pandemic in the sector security and defense and will focus on five priorities include: enhancement capacity military, strengthening the European defense industry, improvement cooperation among EU member states, increase cooperation with partner countries as well as enhancement security cyber. This research will discuss method qualitative with secondary data sources originating from library studies, release of official EU institutions such as the European Commission, European Parliament, European Defense Agency, excerpt interviews from European Union High Representatives such as Joseph Borrell and other relevant literature support.

To sharpen analysis study, the study will analyze the theory of European security in the paradigm Constructivism put forward by Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver and Jaap Wilde (Buzan, 2003). This theory then will be used to explain dynamics security in Europe and explain how European identity an influence has in shaping existing security. Study begins to produce findings that post EU priority agenda setting the Covid-19 pandemic in the sector defense security is an effort to protect member states from external, but also for strengthening European identity in maintaining security.

## **RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

### **POST-PANDEMIC EU SECURITY AND DEFENSE ADAPTATION**

Armed forces of the European Union Member States play an important role during the infecting Covid-19 Pandemic European Union society. The armed forces support authorities civilly, provide support across borders and help citizens with resources Power medical, logistics, as well as security. Josep Borrell as European Union High Representative for Affairs Foreign Affairs and Policy Security as well as Vice President of the European Commission

looked at that the armed forces of the EU member states have the true spirit of solidarity, form group tasks, as well facilitate exchange information related handling of covid-19. Therefore, he agreed to strengthen modality use of military assets in overcast authority civil society in dealing with a pandemic (Borrell, 2020). As for the main focus of the European Union in the security and defence sector as step mitigation in the face form new threats include:

a. Enhancement Capacity military,

Post The covid-19 pandemic is over, almost all together Russia ran aggression with his military to the Ukrainian region which then also gave concern to the surrounding countries. These two events are appropriate to become the basis for the European Union to increase its military. On 10 November 2022, the European Commission and Representative tall submit Plan Action Mobility Military 2.0 and Joint communication about policy the European Union's cyber defense in overcoming environment deteriorating security as well to enhance the EU's capacity to protect citizens and infrastructure (Europe Commission, 2022). Objective Plan Action This military assists the European Armed Forces in resolving more fast, responsive, right on an adequate scale to the broken crisis at the border outside the European Union and beyond. So that the European Union is able to increase its capacity in supporting member countries and partners in terms of distribution weapons and troops.

Reported from the European Commission website, several things to be considered from Plan This action is: a) identification gaps in infrastructure, inform actions that will come as well prioritize repair and integration chain supply material burn for creation movement troops military scale big however take very short time. b) digitization process administration regarding incoming and outgoing logistics (customs) and digitalization of the mobility system military. c) Power Capability development transport strategic military to increase mobility force well-armed through track air nor track sea. d) enhance energy efficiency as well as resilience to climate in the existing transportation system. To be sure This plan was executed well and as it should, the European Commission supports funding project infrastructure transport, meanwhile the European defense fund is used for developing logistics and digitalization systems. It is hoped that with this project, the European Union can move more quickly to do distribution if needed to face threats similar or threats in a new form.

b. Reinforcement Industry European Defense

The Covid-19 pandemic has had a direct impact on the sector, the economies of the European Union member countries, as well as the stock market crash and recession. A few European Union companies engaged in the defense industry escaped from recession, industries like Airbus, Safran, Dassault, Rheinmetall, SAAB lost all profits and experienced losses in amounts that are not little (European Union External Action., n.d.). An ongoing pandemic for more than one year requires public authority to inject funds to save the defense industry. The fall mark shares not the only one threat to the industry defense of the member states of the European Union, in one side government disbursing billions of funds in the face of the coronavirus, a declining economy also has implications for the value of GDP so that priority government to projects defense automatic will be reduced. Project medium long term done like an

airplane program combat stealth naturally will be delayed. Industry disrupted aircraft because the covid-19 pandemic is also one of the reasons for the aircraft industry combat becoming stopped, because most company aircraft fighters are also a manufacturer aircraft relying on commercial business it is in progress life company.

Experience in dealing with Covid-19 as well as effort for maintaining strategy ambitious investment. The European Union requires a more strategic approach to defense- based industry. The Ukrainian Russian conflict also became a consideration to improve the industry defenses they must encourage the development of the industrial base like ensuring supply weapons and tribes enough spares. in short, the EU can mobilize industry civil for help sector defense, meanwhile in range medium, the European Union should be invested in manufacturing advanced, robotics until nanotechnology to advanced materials technology. Giving encouragement to alliance industry or doing integration to rationalize capacity production is a long-term strategy that can be used in a strategic approach.

c. Increasing Cooperation Among Member States of the European Union,

One form of cooperation between EU member states in handling Covid-19 is in the procurement process vaccination. This process includes availability vaccines that are safe and effective in suppressing the spread of covid - 19, and EU member countries with the approach taken by the European Union succeed in securing and facilitating distribution. One form of cooperation in accelerating this process is: through agreement of advance purchase with each manufacturer of vaccines so the European Commission is entitled to buy vaccine at a dose certain, in term specific and price certain, then the Commission gives reward by financing production of “Instruments Support Emergency” of 2.7 billion Euros (Commission., 2021). With the strategy initiated by the European Commission is expected capable support vaccination process more efficient, the goals of the European Union's vaccine strategy include namely, a) for ensure quality, safety and efficacy vaccine, b) secure access appropriate time vaccine to member countries to be distributed to its inhabitants while lead effort global solidarity, c) ensure access fair and affordable vaccines to everyone on the territory of the European Union. In addition to vaccination cooperation, EU member states are also trying to pay attention especially on the border for people who come from an indexed area high variant, put forward border proportional and non - discriminatory travel as well as testing travelers must be maintained especially in the incident area more daily. If needed, quarantine travelers must be strictly enforced with appropriate exceptions.

d. Enhancement of Cooperation with Partner Countries,

The post war cold ended, in part most of the member states of the European Union do not notice its military. Focus activity military then diverted into operation management focused expeditions crisis, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism. After the Covid-19 pandemic occurred as well as the Ukrainian Russian conflict, the European Union and NATO as organization allies began to focus on rebuilding sector defense. This is reflected in the Actions NATO committed to at the Wales Summit to meet alliance targets by spending as much as 2 percent of GDP in spending sector defense. European Union member states that they have long been doing low class

operation, now it has begun the process of reorganizing the military they for war with intensity high, rebuilding the readiness and capability of heavy combat brigades, investing in combatants surface sea, ship dive, ship amphibians as well as attacks distance far away (Morcos et al., 2022). As competition multilateralism global scale demands, the European Union is also increasing cooperation with the United Nations (coordinating with partners on the ground, 13 of the EU's 17 CSDP missions and operations are shared the same theater as the UN mission), coordinating more close to NATO, conducting dialogue and cooperation with all partners international in coping pandemic issue.

The pandemic that hit the European Union seemed like coercing member states of the European Union to improve coordination as well as collaboration between fellow, make careful use of EU defense funds as solution Cost savings. The European Union's defense fund is not only to help industry defense develop but also helps recover industry through research, development and future innovation used by industry civilians in supporting the development of defense capabilities. To speed up this process, the European Union must consider the involvement of a third inclusive party as an exception. Defending the territory of the European Union is the same as maintaining the entire geographical area of the European region. Collaborative and involved parties as well as political will and shared goals can be achieved especially in helping industry EU defense as well strengthening and focusing effort to fill in technological and industry capability gaps.

e. Enhancement of Cyber Security

When the Covid-19 Pandemic hit attack on security cyber is also hit by terror like phishing and ransomware attacks so enhancement security cyber need should be one of the priority agendas considered by the European Union going forward. Three months early when the pandemic took place, the Technology and Communication Team was faced with the reality that they must work throughout time in pursuit project digitization, creating a Far scale big, sure Adequate portable device and capacity network for make everything work. Besides thinking about how everything can be integrated, they should ensure that everything related to cyber can protect confidentiality, integrity as well as data availability. Effort integration cyber security is like real world security like security moment drive, postal service, to use equipment House stairs (Tasheva, 2021).

Cybercrime, which began to emerge with the rise of internet usage in the world, cybercrime during the covid-19 pandemic achieved profit by launching series campaign phishing and ransomware attacks. The European Union Parliament is also moving in to fight crime in cyberspace by legalizing Strengthening law security EU cyber by sectors main. According to the European Commission, attack very expensive cyber even during One year cybercrime against global economy is forecast reached 5.5 trillion Euros (Europe Commission, 2022). At trial Plenary the European Parliament (11/10/2022) is obligatory for EU countries to meet more surveillance and enforcement measures strictly as well as align penalty bound cybercrime that has been approved by members parliament. The first part from the Constitution across the European Union regarding security cyber known as The Network and Information

Security (NIS). NIS is addressed for reach level security and high cyber level in all EU member states. Although famously difficult, the European Parliament and the European Council will be obliged to make security more cyber strict for management risk, liability reporting and various information.

## **History of eu defense and security cooperation**

### **Petersburg Declaration – 1992**

After the end of the Cold War and subsequent conflicts in the Balkans, it became clear that Europe needs to assume its responsibilities in the areas of conflict prevention and crisis management. The conditions under which military units can be deployed were approved by the Council of the European Union in 1992 called the Petersberg Task which is now integrated in the 1999 Amsterdam Agreements. In addition, the post of High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy was created to allow talking on foreign policy issues.

### **Amsterdam Agreement – 1999**

The Amsterdam Treaty was agreed upon by EU Member States in June 1997 and entered into force in May 1999. The Treaty codifies several new structures and tasks for the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the Amsterdam agreement although it does not create a Common Defense Policy as a whole. explicitly, this is considered to have increased shared responsibility in the fields of peacekeeping, security and humanity by creating closer and more harmonious relations between EU member states.

### **European Charter of Human Rights (European Council Meeting in Cologne) – 1999**

Cologne European Council meeting in 1999, that Member States reaffirmed the need for the Union to develop autonomous action capabilities, as well as being supported by a credible military force. In its development, it has been translated back (realization) on the Berlin Plus Agreement which gives the European Union the right under certain conditions to access assets owned by NATO.

### **Berlin Plus Agreement – 2003**

The Berlin Plus Agreement refers to the European Council agreement in Cologne in 1999 which was then set to be more comprehensively agreed upon and finalized in early 2003 between the European Union and NATO. The mandate is to allow the EU to use NATO assets and resources for certain EU-led crisis management operations.

### **European Security Strategy Document – 2003**

In 2003 former High Representative Javier Solana was commissioned by EU Member States to develop a Security Strategy for Europe. The document entitled *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, for the first time has been considered quite comprehensive and has succeeded in analyzing the security of the European Union and identifying security challenges as well as subsequent political implications for the European Union.

### **Lisbon Agreement – 2009**

The Lisbon Agreement entered into force in December 2009 and is a cornerstone in the development of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The agreement included mutual assistance and solidarity clauses that allowed the creation of a European External Action Service (EEAS) under the authority of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs & Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (SDM/VP). Two distinct job functions give the Union High Representative for Foreign and Security Affairs (HR/VP) the possibility to pool and deploy all EU assets necessary for EU crisis management (in certain circumstances/security emergencies).

### **Establishment of the Permanent Structured Cooperation Institution (PESCO) – 2017**

PESCO is a Treaty-based framework and process for deepening defense cooperation among EU Member States that are able and willing to do so. PESCO's goal is to enhance the EU's capacity as an international security actor, contribute to the protection of EU citizens, and maximize the effectiveness of defense spending.

### **Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD) – 2017**

CARD's primary objective is to provide Member States and the European Union with an overview of the existing defense capability landscape in Europe. Another function is to identify areas of potential cooperation among European Union member states. Over time, this will lead to gradual synchronization and mutual adaptation of national defense planning cycles and defense and security capability development practices which in turn will ensure more optimal use of member states' national defense budget expenditures.

### **European Defense Fund (EDF) – Year 2017**

The European Defense Fund (EDF) is a European Commission initiative to support collaborative defense research and development, and to develop an innovative and competitive defense industrial base.

### **European Peace Facility (EPF) – Year 2021**

The European Peace Facility (EPF) expands the EU's capabilities to provide security for its Citizens and partners. This allows the EU to provide EU partners with all types of military equipment and security infrastructure, in accordance with the highest human rights standards.

### **A Strategic Compass for Security and Defense Document – Year 2022**

Strategic Compass is a joint assessment of the analysis of the strategic environment in which the European Union operates, an analysis of the threats and challenges faced by the European Union. The document contains concrete and actionable proposals, along with an implementation schedule plan. Bertuian enhances the EU's ability to act decisively in crises and to defend its security and that of its citizens. This document also covers all aspects of security and defense policies which are structured based on the four pillars of value, namely act, invest, partner, and security (*act, invest, partner, secure*).

**Eu defense and security priority program; two important pillar (pesco & edf)  
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)**

PESCO is an initiative of UE defense cooperation Europe which is important and vital. The existence of PESCO is tasked with providing a framework for defense and defense cooperation among the member states of the Union European participating countries that have signed commitments before. Member States jointly develop defense capabilities, investment defense, improve operational readiness, prepare resilience of their armed forces, as well as collaborate on various projects under subsequent EU Council oversight coordinated and realized by PESCO.

After formed in 2017, PESCO started to become an important pillar cooperation defense of the European Union, to be precise on March 6 2018 the Council of the European Union conducted significant leap in progress cooperation field defense past the “COUNCIL DECISION of 6 March 2018 establishing the list of projects to be developed under PESCO” was agreed upon. This is a list of defense projects that will be realized under PESCO's control. Based on the official release document issued by the Council of the European Union, researchers will present 17 lists of collaborations that will be developed under the coordination of PESCO:

- 1) European Medical Command.
- 2) European Secure Software defined Radio (ESSOR).
- 3) Network of Logistic Hubs in Europe and Support to Operations
- 4) Military Mobility.
- 5) European Union Training Mission Competence Center (EU TMCC).
- 6) European Training Certification Center for European Armies.
- 7) Energy Operational Function (EOF).
- 8) Deployable Military Disaster Relief Capability Package.
- 9) Maritime (semi-) Autonomous Systems for Mine Countermeasures (MAS MCM).
- 10) Harbor & Maritime Surveillance and Protection (HARMSPRO).
- 11) Upgrade of Maritime Surveillance.
- 12) Cyber Threats and Incident Response Information Sharing Platform.
- 13) Cyber Rapid Response Teams and Mutual Assistance in Cyber Security.
- 14) Strategic Command and Control (C2) System for CSDP Missions and Operations.
- 15) Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicle / Amphibious Assault Vehicle / Light Armored Vehicles.
- 16) Indirect Fire Support (Euro Artillery).
- 17) EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core. (Union., 2018)

Here are also researchers present the countries participating in the list of projects the cooperation mentioned above:

| <b>PROJECT</b>               | <b>PROJECT MEMBERS</b>   |
|------------------------------|--|
| 1. European Medical Command; | Germany, Czech Republic, Spain, France, Italy, Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden. |

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|--|--|
| 2. European Secure Software defined Radio (ESSOR);                         | France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Finland  |
| 3. Network of Logistic Hubs in Europe and Support to Operations            | Germany, Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Hungary, Netherlands, Slovenia, Slovakia.   |
| 4. Military Mobility;  | Netherlands, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden |
| 5. European Union Training Mission Competence Center (EU TMCC);            | Germany, Belgium, Czech Republic, Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Romania, Sweden   |
| 6. European Training Certification Center for European Armies;             | Italy, Greece  |
| 7. Energy Operational Function (EOF);                                      | France, Belgium, Spain, Italy  |
| 8. Deployable Military Disaster Relief Capability Package;                 | Italy, Greece, Spain, Croatia, Austria   |
| 9. Maritime (semi-) Autonomous Systems for Mine Countermeasures (MAS MCM); | Belgium, Greece, Latvia, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania  |
| 10. Harbor & Maritime Surveillance and Protection (HARMSPRO);              | Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal   |
| 11. Upgrade of Maritime Surveillance;                                      | Greece, Bulgaria, Ireland, Spain, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus   |
| 12. Cyber Threatsand Incident Response Information Sharing Platform;       | Greece, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Hungary, Austria, Portugal   |
| 13. Cyber Rapid Response Teams and Mutual Assistance in Cyber Security;    | Lithuania, Spain, France, Croatia, Netherlands, Romania, Finland   |

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|---|---------------------------------------|
| 14. Strategic Command and Control (C2) System for CSDP Missions and Operations;             | Spain, Germany, Italy, Portugal       |
| 15. Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicle / Amphibious Assault Vehicle / Light Armored Vehicle; | Italy, Greece, Slovakia               |
| 16. Indirect Fire Support (Euro Artillery );  | Slovakia, Italy                       |
| 17. EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core  | Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus |

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Covid 19 and the War in Ukraine made situation security more urgent to achieve major changes in the Union 's security and defense strategy in Europe. This has also been known for years but not always acted upon. In its development nothing can deny this, the European Union needs capability and a strong will to fight this threatening challenge (EEAS, 2023).

Chief Executive of the European Defense Agency (EDA) Jiri Sedivy stated in the 2022 Annual Report "The choice for the European Union is simple: defense innovation, or defense irrelevance." (EDA, 2022). The ability to innovate in the defense sector is a major requirement in the current situation in Europe. EDA, PESCO, EDF, CARD are frontline cooperation institutions that have the responsibility to respond to challenges and threats to the security of the European Union.

At the beginning of 2023 PESCO's existence again reaped quite an important historical leap. To respond to the challenges of the defense sector after the Covid-19 pandemic and Russia's military aggression against Ukraine, the European Union is required to adjust and update the defense and security strategy for its union territories. PESCO renews its cooperation projects. On May 23, 2023, PESCO again received fresh air by joining Denmark in the collaborations commanded by PESCO (European Commission., 2023).

On this occasion also on 23 May 2023 the Council of the European Union also added the decision to update the list of PESCO projects. As a result, 11 new projects will be added to the list of existing projects that have been developed since December 2018. List of the new project covering ground training, maritime and air systems, security cyber, and some shared services. 11 projects PESCO's new priority post The Covid 19 Pandemic and War Russia-Ukraine is as following:

- 1) European Defense Airlift - Training Academy (EDA-TA)
- 2) Integrated Unmanned Ground Systems 2 (iUGS 2)
- 3) Counter Battery Sensors (CoBaS)
- 4) Anti-Torpedo Torpedo (ATT)
- 5) Critical Seabed Infrastructure Protection (CSIP)
- 6) Future Short-Range Air to Air Missile (FSRM)
- 7) Next Generation Medium Helicopter (NGMH)
- 8) Integrated Multi-Layer Air and Missile Defense System (IMLAMD)
- 9) Arctic Command & Control Effector and Sensor System (ACCESS 10)

10) Robust Communication Infrastructure and Networks (ROCOMIN)

11) ROLE 2F

The follow-up, PESCO's 11 priority programs will then be realized in the near future. According to PESCO, there are 3 programs that will be realized first. The project is considered the most important and has an instant impact on the current situation. The 3 projects include:

1. Critical Seabed Infrastructure Protection (CSIP)

The Critical Seabed Infrastructure Protection Project (CSIP) aims to increase the operational efficiency of the Union Europe in the protection of critical maritime infrastructure by leveraging Source Power, the best military and weaponry today, and innovation asset development underwater weaponry of the future. The six participating member countries So far are: Italy, Germany, Spain, France, Portugal and Sweden. The initial project timetable for requirements gathering and harmonization will run through 2024 with a joint procurement agreement expected in 2028 (European Council, 2023).

2. Next Generation Medium Helicopter (NGMH)

Next Project Generation Medium Helicopter (NGMH) aims to create a special forum that will address the operational needs of both existing fleet upgrades and within EU Member States, aligning the needs and timelines of EU countries. Europe about the future capabilities of Rotorcraft. NGMH will ensure the availability and suitability of the helicopter fleet Europe to 2040 and Rotorcraft preparations for the Next European Generation, including the ability to deal with high intensity conflict. The year of launch and implementation of the project is planned for 2023, with four Member States participating: France, Italy, Finland, and Sweden (European Council, 2023)

3. Counter Battery Sensors (CoBaS)

Counter Project Battery Sensors (CoBaS ) aims to develop a common concept for both counter-battery and counter-battery capabilities utilization of the next generation for the UE armed forces Europe. This project facilitated general procurement of counter- artillery equipment in the future. Current trends in warfare have reaffirmed the importance and massive use of artillery capabilities on the battlefield. In this context, the CoBaS project will enhance the ability of participating Member States to respond more efficiently to future trends in high-intensity conflicts. France and the Netherlands are the two Member States that have participated. CoBaS will deliver the latest capability sets, take advantage of emerging technologies and be adapted to new threat related performance artillery systems developed in the years 2023 – 2035 (European Council, 2023).

### **European Defense Fund (EDF)**

The European Defense Fund (EDF) is an institution created at the initiative of the European Union Commission to support collaborative defense research and development. EDF also has the task of developing an innovative and competitive defense industrial base. The funds are financially used to support a consortium of companies from various member countries conducting cooperative defense research, product development defense equipment and defense technology (Wolf, 2020). EDF aims to strengthen the competitiveness, innovative capacity and efficiency of the European Union's defense industry and contribute to the EU's technological sovereignty. Without substituting the efforts of Member States, dana owned by

the EDF next will promote cooperation among business actors in sector security and defense and researchers across the University Europe. What is meant is research and development of sophisticated and operable defense technology and equipment (European Commission, 2023). In 2017-2019 the focus of EDF is funding The Preparatory Action on Defense Research (PADR). PADR is the main program from EDF, PADR funded 18 research projects that have been selected after going through evaluation and justification of the submitted proposals in 2017 to 2019, this research also includes open calls on Technologists testing new research fields. The research focus desired by EDF includes 3 things namely:

- 1) demonstrate value and superiority EU defense system supported R&T Europe
- 2) Fostering co - operation between Member States and between the EU defense industry
- 3) prepare recruitment academics and scientists on EDF's research agenda begins in 2021 and beyond (EDA,2022).

Futures PADR 3 years' time the have allocation of 90 million euros with details of 25 million euros in 2017, 40 million euros in 2018 and 25 million euros in 2019.

EDF has a budget of 7.9 billion Euros for 2021-2027. The fund will support competitive and collaborative defense projects across the research and development cycle. These funds are of two types of complementary uses. First the funds are used for research and collaborative research in innovative defense technologies. While the second fund is used For and development and purchasing of defense equipment along with the development of new products and technologies in defense systems. Details distribution EDF budget is 2,651 billion euros will be allocated for fund sector research collaborative defense to overcome security threats that arise in the future to come, meanwhile 5,302 billion Euros will fund the project with development collaborative capabilities security of Member States of the European Union (European Commission, 2023).

In Planning EDF funding as stated in the EDF Indicative multiannual perspective 2021-2027 there are 17 priority action categories to be implemented and funded in 2021- 2027 (European Commission, 2023). It is intended that Member States' security / defense industry and systems can focus on investing in security and defense systems research. With a sufficiently detailed allocation it can become design cooperation in a more structured and transparent way. Furthermore, researchers will give a percentage indication EDF budget is planned to be allocated to several categories of actions throughout the multiannual financial framework (2021-2027) in accordance with the release officially issued by the European Commission in Brussels, 29 March 2023.

| <b>Category of actions</b>                                  | <b>Indicative EDF budget contribution during 21-27</b> |
|---|--|
| 1. Defense medical support, CBRN, biotech and human factors |  |
| 2. Information superiority                                  | >10%   |
| 3. Advanced passive and active sensors                      |  |

|  |       |
|--|-------|
| 4. Cyber   |       |
| 5.Space  | >10%  |
| 6.Digital transformation   |       |
| 7. Energy resilience and environmental transition                    | >5%   |
| 8. Materials and components  |       |
| 9. Air combat  | >10%  |
| 10. Air and missile defense  | >5%   |
| 11. Ground combat  | >10%  |
| 12. Force protection and mobility                                    |       |
| 13. Naval combat   |       |
| 14. Underwater warfare   | >10%  |
| 15. Simulation and training  |       |
| 16. Disruptive technologies  | 4%-8% |
| 17. Open calls for innovative and future- oriented defense solutions |       |

For each EDF category of measures that have been planned by EDF along with magnitude allocation the funds will be discussed in a multi-year perspective, effective and efficient. indicative. The selection of topics for the 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026 and 2027 EDF work programs will be decided after through a process of discussion, assessment, consolidation, and justification from Member States, Furthermore, the availability of the results of this EDF program will be held according to priority annual assessment that has been held before (European Commission, 2023).

From the table data above it can be concluded that there are six categories the action gets allocation of EDF funds above 10 percent (information superiority, space, air combat, ground combat, underwater warfare, simulation and training). So can understand that category action is a project EDF's priority in funding the EU's security and defense systems development agenda. Furthermore, this research will briefly explain project priority of the EDF. Here is the description:

#### 1. Information Superiority

Availability and excellence in information is a milestone important in carrying out various forms of operation because in the process of taking military decisions with duration more and more time short, a temporary continuous amount of data increases so the information system needs superiority For successful whole cycle operation. This technology is necessary so that entity commandos at all levels can

immediately create quick, right decisions as well as accurately. In the context of EDF, Actions regarding information superiority will have implications for improvement effectiveness in the field command, control, communications and computing, intelligence, surveillance, security cyber too project EDF ambitious, this can be looked at through contribution allocation of more budget of 10 percent.

As for the results the main thing to expect with it support from EDF 2021-2027 including; a) Prototype Suite device soft field European security and defense, b) Joint Procurement of SOFC2, c) existence standard European Union certification in communications tactical in a combat, d) Joint procurement of MALE RPAS Prototypes, HAPS, RPAS and e) capabilities detect and avoid attack cyber from multiple cybercrime platforms (European Commission, 2023)

## 2. Space

The more advanced technology-based data usage room Space is also needed so that external skills required capable space provide fast service, globally available and sustainable. Use application military Requires the ability to dwell space, strong service, and be tall and reliable. So that this project will be prioritized with EDF contributions regarding external Capabilities normal 10 % of the total available budget. As for what to expect as the output of this project includes: a) integration low PRS receiver system EU military MSs, b) capable SSA capabilities linked to EU SST, c) Prototype based Early Warning outside spaceship, prototype ISR constellation based outside space, d) synergy potential with constellation connectivity room space (European Commission, 2023).

## 3. Air Combat

The category from this project consists of development and integration combat system technology effective and thorough so that possible data exchange and sensor networks are increasingly complex. Development of this Ability will cover aircraft with high class capabilities, manned and unmanned manned to weapon systems special and payload. This project is expected to bring supremacy air through systems and technology aircraft Sophisticated combat and helicopters, Protection capabilities ultimate self but still complies with NATO and European Union regulations, standards, and architectures. EDF contributes more than 10 percent of the total budget with expected output; a) components and technology important in the combat system generation next, b) exists European Union standards for battle air collaborative, c) generation rotorcraft prototype next, d) procurement with Warfare electronic air (European Commission, 2023)

## 4. Ground Combat

Important skills on the runway weaponry land is important, while this category has the main focus among them namely the combat system MBT12, ATV 12, APC14, and ground systems without crew. Member countries expect cooperation in terms of development and improvement of standard architecture, in collaboration with industry defense as well as developing an open modular platform so it can be easily upgraded and configured to reconsider increasingly technology evolve. As for results the main thing to expect with it EDF contribution of more of 10 percent namely; a) Joint development and procurement of a set of different vehicles and

integration technology for vehicle upgrades, b) contributions for future MBT and development of armored vehicles, c) development of demonstrators fire not direct distance far, d) jointly developed UGS, e) improvement connectivity and interaction between ground platform (European Commission, 2023).

#### 5. Underwater Warfare

Need For protect infrastructure maritime and force capacity building be one priority project reflected from more EDF contribution of 10 percent from budget. In future systems come calculated for do collection intelligence, communication, analysis, determination position, supervision and involvement of tasks involved together and networked. So, the challenge generally that will be faced under sea is to exchange broadband information in real time. The expected outputs for this project include; a) Modular semi- autonomous MCM prototype suite, ASW solution without crew, b) development of observation and communication systems distant underwater far, c) development of regional systems for various types of missions.

#### 6. Simulation and Training

The objective of this category is to develop a simulation that is in line with the Strategic Compass the European Union's Security and Defense, especially the high-end training system known as “Simulation CapTech”. This simulator is expected to improve individual abilities and collective abilities of Miter troops who can train with simulation weapons, ships, aircraft and vehicles. The main output expected to exist in this project is a) grow innovation and cooperation for stakeholder interest in security and defence between fellow member countries, b) create an ecosystem in the simulation war / circumstances crisis. c) prepare and align solution techniques for facilitating procurement together (European Commission, 2023).

## CONCLUSION

After the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russo-Ukrainian War, the European Union (EU) faced new challenges, particularly in defense and security. The EU is adapting by prioritizing defense and security agendas to mitigate future threats. The study highlights the EU's focus on enhancing its defense system through initiatives like PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation) and EDF (European Defense Fund). PESCO, established in 2017, initially focused on joint military training and defense systems but has since shifted to more aggressive priorities, including the development of new defense equipment, with 11 key programs set for 2023. EDF, created by the European Commission, funds collaborative defense research and innovation, with a significant budget increase from 90 million Euros (2017-2019) to 7.9 billion Euros (2021-2027). EDF's funding focuses on areas such as cyber, space, air combat, and disruptive technologies. These efforts aim to ensure the EU's defense capabilities remain robust and innovative in response to evolving global threats, supporting both immediate and long-term security needs.

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